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Abstract
This paper focuses on the European 
Union’s engagement – or lack thereof  – 
with Islamist political parties in North 
Africa following the Arab uprisings. 
By delving into the case of  Tunisia’s 
Ennahda, it shows that the party’s growing 
moderation trajectory has been matched 
by a greater pragmatic engagement by 
the EU during the period 2011–16. It is 
argued that this new trend is explained by 
a partial shift in the frames that the EU 
employs to interpret ongoing changes in 
the Middle East and North Africa region 
as well as its interests and potential role in 
the region.
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Introduction
Before the Arab upheavals in 2011, the European Union (EU)’s relations with Islamist 
actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were almost absent. Islamists 
were predominantly excluded from the institutional and political scene in the countries 
of  the region, where authoritarian regimes held a strong control over any form of  expres-
sion, dissent and contestation. The Algerian experience of  1991 had already alarmed 
Western countries, including the European ones, to the point that they were happy to 
support authoritarian secular governments, perceiving them as the only ones able to 
guarantee stability in the region and thus Western interests.1 However, this suddenly 
changed with the Arab uprisings and the transition period that followed. Not only did 
some secular authoritarian regimes collapse under pressure from popular protests, but 
new political actors emerged and acquired a prominent public presence across the region. 
Among these, Islamist parties came out as winners of  the elections in Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt, becoming leading forces of  Islamist-dominated parliamentary majorities and 
governments. Faced with this changed panorama, the EU found itself  in need of  reacting 
and (partially) revising its policies. 
Against this background, this paper analyses EU–Ennahda relations, taking them as an 
illustration of  the EU’s changing approach towards political Islam in North Africa since 
2011. It argues that the EU has moved from a policy of  complete lack of  engagement 
with political Islam in the region in the period preceding the Arab uprisings to partial 
engagement with some Islamist actors in their aftermath. While many Islamists are still 
looked at with suspicion or are outright ostracised, as the case of  Hamas demonstrates, 
the EU has progressively started to engage with those groups that it considers as ‘moder-
ate’, i.e., those who do not threaten the EU’s secular and liberal identity and values, have 
been formally and legitimately elected, and have explicitly renounced violence, of  which 
Ennahda is an example. 
This new engagement with political Islam is explained by the progressive shift from an 
essentialist to a more nuanced understanding of  Islamist actors on the part of  the EU. 
From conceiving all forms and manifestations of  political Islam as a threat, the EU has 
started to appreciate the existence of  different types of  ideological and political strands 
within this broad category. Against the backdrop of  changing domestic and regional 
dynamics in North Africa, the EU’s pragmatic need to find political interlocutors is fil-
tered through its perceptions of  what a moderate actor looks like. The fact that moderate 
1  Timo Behr, ‘EU Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Towards a New Entente in the Post-Arab Spring 
Era?’, The International Spectator 48/1 (2013), pp. 20–33; Said Haddadi, ‘Political Securitization and 
Democratization in the Maghreb: Ambiguous Discourses and Fine-Tuning Practices for a Security 
Partnership’, in Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford and Raffaella Del Sarto (eds), The 
Convergence of  Civilizations. Constructing a Mediterranean Region (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2006), 
pp. 168–90. The only exception to this lack of  engagement can be found in the EU relations with the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey since the early 2000s. This case is however rather spe-
cific, given that Turkey has been part of  the enlargement framework. 
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actors are not seen as a threat and are in positions of  power creates room for engagement 
and feeds back, at the same time, into the way the EU frames political Islam. 
A few clarifications concerning the scope of  the paper are necessary. First, this paper 
focuses on political parties and, more precisely, on the case of  Ennahda. While political 
Islam is a multifaceted phenomenon, with ramifications at both the institutional and civil 
society levels, political parties have played a prominent role in the context of  the political 
and institutional transitions in the region since 2011, an aspect that was also at the core 
of  the EU’s attention and policies towards North African countries. The case of  Ennahda 
stands out as its relations to the EU are an illustrative example of  the new frame of  ‘mod-
eration’ as a basis for pragmatic engagement in EU foreign policy. Whenever necessary, 
references to other Islamist actors will still be made to contextualise the case of  Ennahda 
within the Tunisian and regional landscapes. Second, this paper focuses on the EU at an 
institutional level without necessarily implying that the EU is a monolithic and homoge-
nous entity. While there is variance across EU institutions, this paper identifies common 
trends in their approach to political Islam.
The EU’s Engagement with Ennahda’s Moderating Trajectory 
Founded in 1981 by Rachid Ghannouchi, Ennahda – and its predecessor the Mouvement 
Tendence Islamique (MTI) – gradually developed into one of  Tunisia’s major opposi-
tion movements, choosing the strategy of  participation in the system over revolutionary 
change.2 Banned and persecuted under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, the party 
made a swift and successful comeback to the post-revolutionary political arena by first 
emerging in the elections to the Constituent Assembly in October 2011. Some authors 
have traced the history of  exclusion and violent repression of  Ennahda under the previous 
authoritarian regimes and consider that to be a powerful explanatory factor of  the party’s 
most recent moderating experience.3 Contrary to this view, the most prominent reading of 
2  During President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s first term, Ennahda showed its readiness to participate in 
what was in any case a rigged game and did not openly challenge the hegemony of  the regime. How-
ever, the regime did not allow Ennahda to take part in elections as a party, but several of  its members 
were allowed to run as independent candidates, leading to harsh repression in the wake of  the first 
positive electoral results. Ennahda’s activities were banned in 1991 and its members persecuted. In reac-
tion to the regime’s harsh crack down, many members of  the party leadership were forced into exile. 
Ennahda’s history of  participation and repression differed to some extent from the path of  the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood who, since the 1970s, had chosen to position itself  more as the moral arbiter of 
Egyptian society and was lacking a political party organisation. See Laura Guazzone, ‘Ennahda Isla-
mists and the Test of  Government in Tunisia’, The International Spectator 48/4 (2013), p. 42. 
3  Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, ‘Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of  the Tunisian 
Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party’, Democratization 20/5 (2013), pp. 857–75. These 
authors suggest that in the case of  Ennahda, repression did not lead to radicalisation but supported the 
adoption of  global liberal discourses on democracy and market economy. In addition, they contend that 
without this opening, Ennahda would not have been able to reach a broad Tunisian constituency. In this 
regard, Ennahda’s moderation is reminiscent of  Turkey’s AKP experience. Cihan Tugal, The Fall of  the 
Turkish Model, How the Arab Uprisings brought down Islamic Liberalism (London: Verso, 2016) .
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Ennahda’s trajectory moves from the assumptions of  the so-called ‘moderation through 
inclusion’ paradigm, which holds that inclusion in the political process makes Islamist par-
ties more moderate.4 Irrespective of  the significant flaws of  this hypothesis, it appears to 
be of  some value to understanding Ennahda’s trajectory. The ‘moderation through inclu-
sion’ paradigm is usually articulated around two dimensions: the former is what is usually 
referred to as ‘tactical’ or ‘behavioural’ moderation, while the latter is called ‘ideological’ 
or ‘substantial’ moderation. These terms clearly point to the distinction between modera-
tion happening as a result of  pragmatic compromise and concessions within the political 
realm on the one hand, and moderation of  ideological positions, on the other. In the case 
of  Ennahda, it makes sense to speak of  political compromises out of  political necessity 
followed by a thorough ideological shift. This two-step process completes the moderation 
trajectory of  the former Islamist party.5
The best example of  the first step of  the moderation trajectory stemmed as a result of 
Ennahda’s successfully entering the Tunisian political fray thanks to its participation in the 
elections.6 After years of  authoritarian top-down secularisation policies, and despite the 
fact that Ennahda was not a driving force behind the events of  December 2010–January 
2011, the Islamist party emerged as one of  the major beneficiaries of  political change in 
the country. Ennahda’s moderate Islamist messages converged with the call of  Tunisia’s 
growing, but politically and culturally neglected socially-conservative Arabophone middle 
class, which came to represent the backbone of  the party’s electorate. Representatives of 
the urban pious middle class had long felt sidelined by the Francophone elites who have 
dominated political, cultural and economic life ever since the country’s independence. 
Ennahda was able to successfully present itself  as the voice of  this pious middle class and 
the champion for social justice. Not only did this appeal to a broad constituency within 
the Tunisian society, but it also resonated well with the country’s Western partners, par-
ticularly the EU, as this focus on social justice and an end to corruption was matched 
by the continuation of  existing neoliberal economic policies. Despite some initiatives to 
deepen regional integration with neighbouring countries and extend economic relations 
with other countries of  the region like Turkey and Qatar, Europe in general, and France 
in particular, have continued to be Tunisia’s primary trading partners.7 Once in power, 
‘the combination of  respect for private property and free enterprise with charity and anti-
corruption stances’ has allowed Ennahda to strike a balance between reassuring foreign 
4  Jilian Schwedler, ‘Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothe-
sis’, World Politics 63/2 (2011), pp. 347–376.
5  Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, ‘The Islamists Compromise in Tunisia’, Journal of  Democracy 26/4 (2015), pp. 
110–124.
6  Ennahda’s participation in Tunisian politics has been marked by gradualism and alliance-seeking atti-
tudes. For example, prior to the 2011 elections to the Constituent Assembly, Ennahda’s leader Rachid 
Ghannouchi declared that even if  the party had an overall majority it would seek a coalition with other 
political (secular) forces. Monica Marks, ‘Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the context of 
ISIS and the Egyptian Coup’, Brookings Working Paper (2015). Available at https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Tunisia_Marks-FINALE-5.pdf  (accessed 20 March 2017).
7  Amel Boubekeur,‘Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition’, 
Mediterranean Politics 21/1 (2016), pp. 107–127.
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investors, on the one hand, and responding to the domestic Islamist camp’s calls for more 
social justice on the other.8 
The October 2011 electoral victory was both the result of  and a starting point for tac-
tical moderation followed by ideological moderation. In the context of  the prolonged 
and contentious constitution-making process, which lasted from October 2011 till Febru-
ary 2014, Ennahda displayed its acceptance of  principles it had previously ideologically 
opposed. Three of  them are of  crucial interest to understand the trajectory of  the party. 
First, the constitution declares Tunisia a ‘civil state’, thus rejecting any form of  religious 
interference into the state. Second, there is no reference to shariʿa (Islamic law) but only 
to the ‘teachings of  Islam’, thus explicitly excluding any role for the Islamic religious 
corps. Finally, the new Tunisian constitution grants the right to ‘freedom of  conscience 
and belief ’.9 By accepting this content of  the constitution after engaging in negotiations 
and compromises in the context of  the troika-based government, Ennahda was able to 
consolidate its pragmatic identity in a way that matched the normative definition of  mod-
eration accepted by external players, including the EU. This definition includes references 
to values and principles, such as the civilian character of  the state and the granting of  the 
freedom of  conscience and belief, in addition to Ennahda’s renouncing of  violence and 
participating in formal politics according to the democratic rules of  the game. Other signs 
of  Ennahda’s tendency to share power and to prioritise inclusion were its respect of  civil 
rights and liberties of  all individuals, and its more balanced representation of  women in 
political bodies. Ennahda agreed to drop an initial reference to the ‘complementary role’ 
of  women to men that appeared in one of  the earlier drafts of  the constitutional text 
sponsored by male and female Islamist members of  parliament. The 2014 Constitution 
guarantees equality before the law for men and women, and the 1956 personal status code 
granting women equality with men remains in force.
The moderation and pragmatism demonstrated by Ennahda opened the way to the estab-
lishment of  working relationships with the EU as a key partner in the country’s transition 
towards democracy, a process which further reinforced the moderation trajectory of  the 
Islamist party.10 At the top of  the 2011 EU agenda towards the MENA region in general, 
and Tunisia in particular, stood the issue of  political reform and governance. In the EU’s 
view, the first steps to accomplish these goals were, on the one hand, the implementation 
of  sound electoral processes through fair procedures and competition, and on the other, 
the drafting of  a new constitution that guarantees basic freedoms and rights to the popu-
lation, and means to enforce them, as well as vertical and horizontal accountability. These 
priorities became the basis for the development of  a working relationship between the EU 
and Ennahda, in light of  its role as a key political actor in post-uprisings Tunisia. 
8  Dalacoura calls this attitude ‘pious neoliberalism’. See Katerina Dalacoura, ‘Islamism and Neoliberal-
ism in the Aftermath of  the 2011 Arab Uprisings: The Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Nahda 
in Tunisia’, in Emel Akcali (ed), Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of  the State in the Middle East and North 
Africa (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 64.
9  Netterstrøm, ‘The Islamists Compromise in Tunisia’. 
10  See ‘Tunisie: Conclusions du Conseil Affaires étrangères’, Conseil de l’Union Européenne. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126043.pdf  (accessed 
28 August 2014).
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During the constitution-making phase, the EU demonstrated its willingness to engage with 
the moderate Islamist party in power on the basis of  common values. In the joint decla-
ration that the two parties made on the occasion of  the Tunisian Islamist Prime Minister 
Hamadi Jebali’s visit to the European Commission in February 2012, it was stated that: 
The visit has enabled the launch of  a high-level political dialogue between the 
new Tunisian authorities and the EU authorities with a view to initiate a new 
phase of  bilateral relations allowing, based on shared values, for stronger support 
from the EU for Tunisia and progressive integration into the European Single 
Market.11 
Furthermore, the EU has made use of  a number of  instruments to support the country’s 
transition towards democracy. Since 2011 and up to June 2016, Tunisia has received more 
than €1 billion in grants, over €890 million of  which provided through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. During 2011–2013, Tunisia received €445 million in develop-
ment assistance under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 
amounting to nearly twice the sum initially earmarked for the country for that period. 
The majority was allocated to support the economy, with a focus on alleviating (youth) 
unemployment problems.12 Tunisia was also the first beneficiary of  funding (€155 mil-
lion) through the Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) 
Programme, which provides assistance on a ‘more for more’ basis for partner countries 
showing sustained commitment to, and progress towards, democratic reform. The finan-
cial and material assistance provided to Tunisia was matched by the establishment of 
a privileged partnership between the country and the EU in 2012. This special status 
reflects the EU’s commitment to supporting the country’s transition as it tackles a number 
of  interrelated challenges and has been reiterated at the highest political level, such as 
during the special attendance of  the head of  the Tunisian government, Habib Essid, at 
the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of  20 July 2015, chaired by the High Representative 
Federica Mogherini.13 During the meeting, the EU stated its will ‘to support Tunisia in its 
democratic transition, at this difficult time for its economy, especially for its tourism indus-
try, and at a difficult time in terms of  security challenges and the fight against terrorism, 
in which we are all united.’14
With rising concerns about the spread of  terrorism and insecurity in the MENA region, 
the EU has become increasingly sensitive to the need to fight instability in the region for 
its own security and to prop up the fragile democratic Tunisian transition to democracy. 
Among the security concerns that have seen their salience growing between 2014–2015 is 
11 ‘Relations UE–Tunisie: Déclaration Conjointe ‘Vers un Partenariat Privilégié’’, [EU–Tunisia Rela-
tions: Joint Declaration ‘Towards a Privileged Partnership], European Commission, 2 February 2012. 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-62_en.htm (accessed 28 August 2014).
12  Vera Van Hüllen, EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring (New York: Palgrave, 2015).
13  See ‘Relations between the EU and Tunisia’, European Union, 15 September 2016. Available at https://
eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/10_tunisia_4pg.pdf  (accessed 27 July 2016).
14  See ‘Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini following her meeting 
with the Tunisian Prime Minister Habib Essid’, European Union External Action, 20 July 2015. Available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150720_02_en.htm (accessed 5 August 2016).
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the nexus between terrorism and violent radicalisation which is perceived as particularly 
worrisome for EU member states in light of  both Europe’s heightened exposure to them 
due to its geographical interdependence with the MENA region, and to Europe’s own 
internal problems of  social cohesion and integration. Another area of  growing concern 
for EU authorities relates to the lack of  socio-economic reforms and governance, which 
feeds instability. Most countries in the region have seen their socio-economic situation 
significantly deteriorate since 2011, with the root causes of  the Arab uprisings, like unem-
ployment, poverty, inequality and corruption, still in place. This is perceived to be linked 
in a mutually reinforcing, vicious circle with the rise of  insecurity and the risk of  violent 
radicalisation among some of  the most vulnerable groups, particularly the youth, and sec-
ond-generation European citizens originally coming from the MENA region. Against this 
backdrop, Tunisia has become the target of  increased cooperation both by EU institutions 
and EU member states to address the root causes of  violent radicalisation and to offset the 
disruptive impact of  the Libyan conflict on Tunisia.15 
The different forms of  engagement the EU has employed with Ennahda have been instru-
mental in further anchoring Tunisia and its moderate Islamist party to democratic and 
liberal values. On the one hand, this has resulted in Ennahda further distancing itself  from 
the more radical Salafist factions in light of  their often-ambiguous stance towards radical-
isation and terrorism episodes. On the other, Ennahda’s moderation trajectory has been 
boosted to the point that the party congress that took place in May 2016 saw its religious 
authority and political leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, declare that there is no longer room 
for political Islam in post-Arab Spring Tunisia.16 As a justification for breaking with the 
tradition of  political Islam, other party cadres stated that ‘now that Ennahda is engaged in 
open, legal party politics under a new Constitution, which it helped write, and competes 
for national leadership, the Islamist label [has] become more a burden than a benefit.’17 
The public renunciation of  Islamism has been saluted by many observers as a strategic 
decision to appease secular elites in the country and the West or, more genuinely, as a sign 
of  the completion of  the process of  ideological moderation undergone by the party in the 
aftermath of  the Arab uprisings, thus acquiring a new, post-Islamist identity, similar to 
that of  the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey.18 This stems from the party’s 
pragmatic approach to politics – it does not involve a complete departure from Islamic 
15  See ‘Programmation de l’Instrument Européen de Voisinage (IEV) (2014–2017) Cadre Unique d’Ap-
pui pour l’appui de l’UE à la Tunisie (2014–2015)’, European External Action Service. Available at http://
collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-
the-enp/tunisia_2014_2015_programming_document_fr.pdf  (accessed 12 June 2016).
16  Rached Ghannouchi, ‘From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy: The Ennahda Party and the 
Future of  Tunisia’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2016. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/tunisia/political-islam-muslim-democracy (accessed 24 June 2017).
17  Hussein Ibish, ‘‘Islamism Is Dead!’ Long Live Muslim Democrats’, The New York Times, 2 June 2016. 
Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/tunisias-new-revolution.html?mcubz=1 
(accessed 25 June 2017).
18  Dalacoura, ‘Islamism and Neoliberalism in the Aftermath of  the 2011 Arab Urprisings’; Boubekeur, 
‘Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia’.
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tenets, but rather from ideological conceptions that have proven to be impossible to be 
implemented through electoral gains. At the same time, domestically, while a more mod-
erate course underpins Ennahda’s integration into the incumbent system as a democratic 
yet conservative Islamic party, this strategy also risks further stirring internal debates to the 
detriment of  cohesion. In reality, Ennahda has never been a monolithic body but it has 
always been characterised by different layers and divergent tendencies ranging from mod-
erate to more conservative both from the ideological–political and the economic points 
of  view. The struggle to manage the expectations of  the ultra-conservative ideological 
segment while attempting to integrate into the hegemonic system by appeasing secular 
elites will be the ultimate test for the party’s political future. 
Framing the ‘Moderate’: The EU and Political Islam
This new trend in the EU’s approach to Ennahda reflects a partially changed under-
standing of  political Islam. While the Union and its member states’ material interests and 
preoccupations for security and stability are important, these are shaped and conceived 
through the ways in which the EU makes sense of  its environment and a changing reality. 
EU policies are thus shaped and implemented on the basis of  different frames, defined as 
ways of  interpreting information by ‘promot[ing] a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’.19 Frames simplify 
reality by organising events and processes in a way that permits to identify an issue and 
provides a roadmap for addressing it.20 This way, they are cognitive tools that shape how 
actors perceive themselves, their interests and their actions. 
This also applies to the way in which the EU makes sense of  the events in the MENA 
region and how it responds to them. For a long time, the EU framed political Islam as 
a monolithic phenomenon and an existential threat. The lack of  understanding of  the 
complexity of  Islamists in the MENA region emerges from documents produced in the 
framework of  the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood 
Programme, in which political Islam is seldom mentioned and, if  so, only in broad terms 
that refer to ‘Islamist movements’ or ‘Islamist political parties’.
The idea of  political Islam as a rather monolithic entity and, more importantly, as a threat 
to the EU is not surprising, if  one considers that the EU’s self-conception, which is well 
reflected in its foundational treaties and its domestic and foreign policies,21 is based on 
secularism and liberalism (intended both politically as supportive of  pluralism and civil 
19  Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of  a Fractured Paradigm’, Journal of  Communica-
tion 43/4 (1993), p. 52.
20  Lisa V. Bardwell, ‘Problem-Framing: A Perspective on Environmental Problem-Solving’, Environmen-
tal Management 15/5 (1991), pp. 603–12; David Dery, ‘Agenda Setting and Problem Definition’, Policy 
Studies 21/1 (2000), pp. 37–47.
21  See ‘Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on European Union’, Official Journal of  the European Union 326, 
26 October 2012. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CEL-
EX:12012M/TXT&from=EN (accessed 3 May 2016).
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and political liberties, and economically as promoter of  market-friendly policies). The lib-
eral aspects are rather evident in EU democracy promotion policies in the MENA region, 
as the EU has always fostered specific models of  democracy and civil society matching 
its liberal ideas,22 with less attention given to the specific needs of  the targets of  its poli-
cies.23 Moreover, and based on the appreciation of  the benefits of  secularism, separation 
between religious principles and political activities – and hence the privatisation of  reli-
gion – has always been highly praised by the EU and viewed as the only form of  political 
organisation positively associated with a stable and secure environment.24 
The EU’s identity being the result of  a process of  othering,25 whereby the other is depicted 
as ‘inherently different and as a threat to its identity’,26 political Islam was regarded as an 
undifferentiated threat to the EU’s own secular and liberal identity. As Shakman Hurd 
argues, the secular reading of  political Islam made by the West portrays it as either a 
backlash against modernity or a threat incompatible to modern and Western principles 
of  society.27 Related to this, both the role that political Islam attributes to religion in the 
public sphere and some Islamist positions on a number of  issues, such as women’s rights 
and religious minorities, are also perceived as rather problematic from a liberal perspec-
tive.28 Due to the EU’s monolithic view and the perception of  an identity threat, Islamist 
actors were thus not engaged with. The EU’s only form of  engagement with political 
Islam, when occurring, was defined in cultural terms, via the inter-cultural dialogue which 
mainly reinforced the reproduction of  existing stereotypes.29
22  Milja Kurki, ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of  Democratic Civil Societies’, International Polit-
ical Sociology 5 (2011), pp. 349–66; Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie, ‘Promoting Embedded Democracy? 
Researching the Substance of  EU Democracy Promotion’, European Foreign Affairs Review 16/5 (2011), 
pp. 565–88.
23  Michelle Pace, ‘The EU’s Interpretation of  the ‘Arab Uprisings’: Understanding the Different Visions 
about Democratic Change in EU–MENA Relations’, JCMS: Journal of  Common Market Studies 52/5 
(2014), pp. 969–84.
24  David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of  Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of  Minnesota Press, 1998); Luca Mavelli, ‘Security and Secularization in International Rela-
tions’, European Journal of  International Relations 18/1 (2012), pp. 177–99.
25  Iver B. Neumann, Uses of  the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University 
of  Minnesota Press, 1991); Edward Said, Orientalism [Western Conceptions of  the Orient] (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1991).
26  Bahar Rumelili, ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of 
Differentiation’, Review of  International Studies 30/1 (2004), pp. 27–47; Neumann, Uses of  the Other; Iver 
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This essentialist reading of  political Islam was partially scratched after the 9/11 attacks, 
when the EU started to draw a distinction between terrorism/radical Islamism and mod-
erate forms of  political Islam. While the former continued to be perceived as an existential 
threat to the West, the EU became more sensitive to the need to identify potential interloc-
utors.30 By describing ‘moderate’ actors as those ‘Muslim organisations and faith groups 
that reject the distorted version of  Islam put forward by al-Qaida and others’ in the 2005 
EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism as well as ‘those 
political organisations which promote democracy by non-violent means’ by the European 
Parliament,31 there was a growing recognition that political Islam had to be treated differ-
ently. Proposals about the need for engagement with non-violent and non-revolutionary 
Islamist actors were also made by the Task Force on Political Islamism – a group created 
in 2006 within the Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations with the aim 
of  offering training programmes on and gathering significant knowledge about Islamism 
worldwide.32 However, this initial appreciation of  political Islam as a rather variegated 
and complex phenomenon did not lead to a revision of  EU policies towards Islamists. 
While some EU delegations had some informal contact with Islamist actors, either on the 
ground or in Europe, engagement did not amount to any type of  official, and even less so, 
coherent and systematic approach by the EU as a whole.33 
The ‘game changer’ in the framing of  political Islam were the Arab uprisings, which were 
followed by the electoral victories of  some Islamist parties, like Ennahda in Tunisia and the 
newly-constituted Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Moreover, a variety of  Isla-
mist actors, including Salafists, former jihadists, independent Islamists and Sufis, started to 
occupy the space left by secular and leftist forces, after years, if  not decades, of  exclusion, 
co-optation and repression.34 Compared to other still important events happening in the 
EU’s neighbourhood or beyond, the Arab uprisings represented a deeper and more struc-
tural change that the EU could not but react and adjust to. In other words, the EU had to 
wake up to a different reality that challenged its old views of  political Islam and opened up 
the way for a reframing process that has led to the categorisation of  ‘moderate’ Islamists.
The Islamist other has indeed started to be assessed in light of  the behaviours and stances 
adopted by individual groups or parties within each specific context. By becoming more 
sensitive to the existing differences among them, the EU has progressively identified some 
Islamist parties as being, if  not fully compatible with, at least not a direct threat to its own 
identity, values and interests. The category of  ‘moderation’, which started to be sketched 
Dilemma of  Recognising Counterparts’, International Politics 46/5 (2009), pp. 616–35; Sarah Wolff, ‘US 
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in the early 2000s, now acquired clearer features, referring to those Islamists that do not 
openly challenge the EU’s secular and liberal identity, adhere to democratic principles, 
accept liberal conceptions in both the political and the economic domains in their exercise 
of  power, and temper their religious discourse.35 The acceptance of  the democratic rules 
of  free and competitive elections and the respect for political and civil rights are concom-
itantly met with the renunciation of  violence. In addition, and as suggested by an EU 
official, moderate Islamist actors are often considered to be those that ‘work with us and 
contribute to serving our perceived interests’.36
Given the relational nature of  moderation, the ‘moderate’ Islamist parties are implicitly 
conceived in opposition to terrorist groups and other violent Islamist actors, or conserva-
tive and illiberal Islamists, with whom the EU does not engage in any form of  dialogue 
or interaction.37 For example, former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton distin-
guished between ‘radical Salafists’ and ‘the more moderate Islamists’,38 while current 
High Representative Federica Mogherini repeated on several occasions that ‘[p]olitical 
Islam is a very broad classification: it can include democratic parties as well as radical 
movements’.39 The EU has also been clear in stating its support for those actors that abide 
by democratic principles and respect the rule of  law, human rights and gender equality,40 
thus reinforcing some ‘red lines’ for its engagement with Islamist parties.
The reframing process undergone by the EU’s stance towards Islamist actors has thus 
come full circle since its tepid beginning following the 9/11 attacks and, more convinc-
ingly, in the wake of  the Arab uprisings. 
Conclusions: The Future of Engagement
The EU’s response to the coming to power of  Islamist political actors in the region has 
been the result of  a revised framing of  political Islam, centred on the category of  mod-
eration. This has further been underpinned by two additional levers, differentiation, on 
the one hand, and pragmatism, on the other. The former refers to the principle that 
represents the new norm in the EU’s approach to the countries of  the MENA region 
following the Arab uprisings, which has been enshrined in the new EU’s strategy towards 
35  Kausch, Plus ca Change.
36  Interview with EU official, Brussels, June 2014.
37  Netterstrøm, ‘The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia’. 
38  Answer to E-008155/2012 given by High Representative/Vice President Ashton on behalf  of  the 
Commission. Brussels, 20 November 2012.
39  Answer to E-003641/16 given by Vice President Mogeherini on behalf  of  the Commission, Brussels, 
20 October 2016. See also Answer to E-011771/2015 given by High Representative/Vice President 
Mogherini, Brussels, 29 October 2015.
40  See for example, Council of  the European Union, Press release, 3124th Council Meeting, Brussels, 14 
November 2011; Answer to E-002079/2011 given by the High Representative/Vice President Ashton 
on behalf  of  the Commission, Brussels, 12 May 2011; Statement by President Barroso following his 
meeting with Mr Mohamed Morsi, President of  Egypt, 13 September 2012.
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the region. This principle has made its way into, and has shaped, the EU’s engagement 
with the Islamist actors (or lack thereof) in a mutually reinforcing dynamic that has fur-
ther increased the distance across and within countries in terms of  the actors, groups or 
individuals, policy sectors and initiatives the EU is keen on engaging with and actively 
supporting. The case of  the EU’s engagement with Ennahda is to some extent a product 
of  this differentiation. However, the more forthcoming approach towards Islamist parties 
and the more systematic engagement with the moderate strands across the region, as dis-
played in the case of  Ennahda, did not amount to a U-turn in the EU’s stance. This was 
indeed dictated by a significant dose of  pragmatism and continuity, and is as such easily 
reversible when confronted by a different set of  domestic and regional circumstances, as 
the Egyptian case demonstrates. 
Pragmatism can indeed be regarded as the driving force behind the EU’s behaviour vis-à-
vis Ennahda and other moderate Islamist parties against the backdrop of  a more nuanced 
appreciation of  changing domestic political contexts and thus of  the EU’s interests. The 
reframing process undergone by the EU’s stance towards Islamist actors has provided new 
meaning to the concept of  pragmatism that has tended to characterise the EU’s stance 
towards the region since 2011. The need to ensure the success of  the Tunisian democratic 
transition by defending it against the spread of  violent radicalisation and terrorism has 
been a key consideration prompting the EU to engage pragmatically with Ennahda on the 
basis of  its increasingly moderate – and equally pragmatic – stances. As such, pragmatism 
has also been enshrined in the new EU Global Strategy, unveiled in June 2016, as one of 
the key principles guiding its external relations. In light of  its flexible nature, the concept 
and practice of  pragmatism can easily be used to describe very different situations. 
The cases of  the Tunisian and the Egyptian Islamist parties are in point here and diverge 
substantially. In Egypt, the failure of  the Muslim Brotherhood to create an inclusive 
system of  government and their violent ousting by the military-backed leadership in mid-
2013 have led to a partial freezing of  the EU’s engagement with the Islamists there and to 
its continued cooperation with the incumbent military regime because of  security preoc-
cupations. In contrast, the set of  relations established between Ennahda and the EU have 
yielded positive results in the context of  Tunisia’s democratising trend and have further 
encouraged the EU to continue along its path of  normalising relations with the Islamists, 
not viewing them as a threat to its identity, but rather as a necessary partner to ensure the 
stability of  the country. 
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